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Hearsay Statements Made by Child Abuse Victims to a Social 
Worker May Not Be Admitted at a Criminal Trial Through the 
Social Worker under Maryland's "Tender Years" Statute 
By: Erica C. Mudd 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held certain hearsay statements may not be admitted at a 
criminal trial through a social worker's testimony under MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001). State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 
68, 867 A.2d 314, 316 (2005). In affirming the intermediate appellate 
court's decision, the Court found statements made by child abuse 
victims to a social worker were improperly admitted through the social 
worker in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, as the statements were testimonial in nature and the 
declarants were available to testify. !d. at 74, 867 A.2d at 319. 
In late January 2002, three girls between the ages of eight and 
ten-years-old accused Michael Conway Snowden ("Snowden") of 
inappropriate touching. Snowden denied the girls' allegations, 
although police were contacted and a joint investigation by the 
Montgomery County Police Department and Child Protective Services 
for Montgomery County ensued. 
As part of that investigation, the girls were separately 
interviewed by Montgomery County Department of Health and Human 
Services sexual abuse investigator, Amira Abdul-Wakeel ("Wakeel"). 
At the beginning of each interview, the girls expressed awareness that 
the interviews were being conducted as a result of the accusations 
made against Snowden. Subsequent to the interviews, Snowden was 
arrested on a warrant issued upon information obtained by Wakeel 
during her interviews with the girls. 
Snowden was indicted on one count of child abuse and six 
counts of third-degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, the State filed a 
motion to invoke Maryland's "tender years" statute, codified at MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001). That statute allows the 
State to substitute a health or social work professional's testimony in 
place of a child's where the court determines the child's statements 
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possesses "specific guarantees oftrustworthiness." !d. at 73, 867 A.2d 
at 319. 
In accordance with the statute's framework, the trial judge 
examined the girls and ruled that Wakeel's testimony of their accounts 
satisfied the requirements necessary to invoke the statute. The girls 
were permitted to depart, and their accounts of abuse were admitted 
into evidence through Wakeel. 
Based largely on Wakeel's testimony, Snowden was found 
guilty on all counts following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County. He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which held, in light of the recent decision by the United 
States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
that (1) Wakeel's testimony violated Snowden's right to confrontation, 
as the girls were available to testify, and (2) the girls' interview 
statements to Wakeel were sufficiently testimonial in nature. !d. at 74, 
867 A.2d at 319 (citing Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 157, 846 
A.2d 36, 47 (2004)). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding the 
introduction of hearsay evidence, pursuant to MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 11-304, violated Snowden's right to confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution in light of 
Crawford v. Washington. !d. at 74, 867 A.2d 319-20. 
The Court began its analysis with brief explanations of the 
Confrontation Clause ("Clause") and Maryland's "tender years" 
statute. !d. at 75, 867 A.2d at 320. The Court explained that the 
Clause, which provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him," falls short of proclaiming a defendant's right to confront his 
accuser face-to-face at trial absolute. !d. at 75, 867 A.2d at 320 (citing 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 863 (1990) (holding the Clause is not 
violated when the State presents the testimony of a child victim by 
way of closed circuit television)). The Court further explained, by 
way of the United States Supreme Court holding in Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56 (1980), this less-than-absolute right allows the admission 
of hearsay statements in a criminal trial when the declarant is 
unavailable and the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 
!d. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
According to the Court, subsequent to the establishment of the 
Roberts "indicia of reliability" standard, many states, including 
Maryland, enacted statutes permitting the admission of certain hearsay 
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statements in criminal trials. !d. The Maryland "tender years" statute, 
first codified in 1988, is among this group, and was designed to ensure 
the adequate prosecution of child abuse and sexual offense crimes. 
See !d. at 75-76, 867 A.2d 320-21. To comport with Roberts, the 
statute requires the out-of-court statement to possess "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." !d. at 76, 867 A.2d 321 (quoting MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001)). 
As the Court of Appeals aptly recognized, however, the 
Crawford decision has fundamentally altered Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. !d. at 78, 867 A.2d 322. Specifically, the Crawford 
Court held the introduction of a defendant's wife's tape-recorded 
statements at trial violated the defendant's right to confrontation. !d. 
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36). That decision effectively overruled 
the Roberts "indicia of reliability" standard. !d. at 79, 867 A.2d at 
322. In doing so, the Crawford Court determined the Roberts standard 
thwarted both the Framer's goal and vision of the Clause: insuring 
reliability of evidence. !d. Thus, the Crawford Court set forth a new 
test, that the "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness may be 
offered into evidence at a criminal trial only when the defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. !d. 
Although failing to define "testimonial," the Crawford Court 
enumerated characteristics of testimonial statements. !d. at 80, 867 
A.2d at 323. The Crawford Court explained, such statements share a 
common nucleus in that each involves a formal or official statement 
made or elicited for the purpose of being introduced at a criminal trial. 
!d. at 81, 867 A.2d at 324. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36). The Court 
of Appeals interpreted this to mean that when a statement is made in 
the course of a criminal investigation initiated by the government, the 
Clause forbids its introduction unless the defendant had prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. !d. 
Applying the objective standards of Crawford to the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals explained, an ordinary person in the girls' 
positions would have anticipated that statements made to a sexual 
abuse investigator would be used in a subsequent prosecution. !d. at 
84, 867 A.2d at 325. As such, the Court determined that the 
interviews with Wakeel were the functional equivalent of formal 
police questioning, and therefore, the girls' statements were 
testimonial in nature. !d. 
In support of this determination, the Court pointed to the 
interviews being conducted as part of a formal police investigation, the 
presence of law enforcement during the interviews, and the girls' 
138 
awareness of the interview(s) purpose. Id. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 325-
26. Further, the Court found Wakeel's role as an interviewer akin to a 
police officer in a routine police interrogation, likening her to an agent 
of the police department. I d. at 86, 867 A.2d 326-27. Moreover, the 
Court reasoned that even if the statements were made for the sole 
purpose of satisfying the requirements of the tender years statute, they 
remained testimonial in nature. ld. at 85, 867 A.2d 326. 
Although the Court of Appeals recognized potential situations 
where a child is too young or immature to understand the testimonial 
nature of his or her statements, it concluded young children's 
statements can possess the same testimonial nature as those of other 
more competent declarants. Id. 89, 867 A.2d 328-29. In that regard, 
the Court declared the appropriate test for determining whether a 
statement is testimonial in nature is based on an objective person, not 
that of an objective child of similar age. !d. at 90-91, 867 A.2d at 329. 
While sympathizing with public policy concerns aimed at 
limiting child victims' exposures to potentially traumatizing courtroom 
experiences, the Court expressed it, "must be faithful to the 
Constitution's deep concern for the fundamental rights of the 
accused." Id. at 90, 867 A.2d at 829. The Court clearly noted, 
however, that the holding in this case does not render Maryland's 
tender years statute useless. Id. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. The Court 
explained that the statutory framework certainly contemplates other 
circumstances in which a child's non-testimonial statements could be 
supplied constitutionally by a health or social work professional. ld. 
Further, the court was silent as to whether non-investigatory 
statements could be admissible in light of Crawford. Id. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Snowden clearly stands for 
the proposition that preserving the fundamental rights of the criminally 
accused is of preeminent importance. The opinion, however, is not 
without bittersweet undertones. Protecting child sexual abuse victims 
and preserving their accounts of abuse is hardly a peripheral concern. 
While the Court carefully crafted its opinion with the intent of 
preserving Maryland's tender years statute, the law appears to be de-
stabilized. As such, future prosecutorial invocation of MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 will likely pose a sizable challenge. 
Nevertheless, whether a proponent of defendants' or victims' rights, 
the future of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, especially as it 
relates to the tender years statute, will be worth tracking. 
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